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Abstract
Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple
systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different under-
lying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing
that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively
explained. I defend this position by applying the framework to a sim-
ple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductors. I go
on to compare my position to those advocated in Polger & Shapiro
(2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (1999). Contra these respective
authors I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can
be explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory
strategy. As such, multiple realisation poses a non-trivial challenge to
reduction which can, nonetheless, be met.
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1 Introduction
That some phenomena are multiply realised by different kinds of lower-
level system poses a challenge to reduction. In part, this challenge can be
expressed as a demand for explanation: how is it that multiple different
kinds of systems can exhibit the same phenomena? The challenge to reduc-
tion then depends on the claim that this demand for explanation cannot be
met – that multiple realisation (MR) cannot be reductively explained.1 My
goal in this paper is to rebut that view: I’ll offer a framework for explaining
MR.
A further goal of the paper relates to the somewhat confusing array of
views regarding multiple realisation and explanation in the philosophy lit-
erature – one upshot of this paper will be to disentangle the various philo-
sophical positions.
Polger and Shapiro (2016) articulate a position whereby multiple real-
isation cannot be explained. However, their view of multiple realisation
also implies that it is hardly ever (if ever) instantiated. In other words,
they argue that, insofar as putative instances of multiple realisation can be
explained, these do not count as genuine instances of multiple realisation.
For reasons developed below, I think that this approach is strategically
mistaken: first, it’s typical among both philosophers and scientists to ac-
cept that multiple realisation is commonplace (examples range from pegs
and boards to pain), thus the re-labelling strategy implicitly advocated by
Polger and Shapiro seems unlikely to catch on. Second, the demand for
explanation is a genuine one – multiple realisation poses an explanandum
which ought to be taken seriously. Were Polger and Shapiro’s view to be
accepted, it’s not even clear how to express this explanandum, let alone how
it could be addressed.
So let’s say that there is MR in the world. What, then, of the question
with which we started: can MR be explained? A forceful advocate of the
claim that there is MR in the world is Batterman (2018), who provides var-
ious examples from physics where it seems incontrovertible that different
kinds of system do in fact exhibit the same phenomena. However, Batter-
man’s view is that MR blocks reduction; he claims that the kinds of expla-
nation of MR which are available essentially involve anti-reductionist ex-
1I use ‘MR’ to refer to ‘multiple realisation’, ‘multiple realisability’, ‘multiply realised’,
. . .
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planatory strategies; for similar arguments see Morrison (2012, 2014). While
I agree with Batterman and Morrison that MR is found in the world, I dis-
agree that it can’t be reductively explained.2
I accept that MR is found in the world, that MR posits a non-trivial ex-
planandum, and that a reductive answer to that explanandum can be found in
at least some cases. A likely ally might thus be Sober (1999) who advocates
explanatory pluralism in answering questions about MR. However, I claim
that none of the explanatory strategies canvassed by Sober is sufficient to
explain how MR is instantiated in the world. As such, I argue that an ad-
ditional explanatory strategy ought to be added to the toolbox in order to
rebut claims that MR is reductively inexplicable.
In §2 I’ll set out what I take MR to involve, and how it might be ex-
plained. I’ll develop this account with a simple case study from physics
in §3. The remainder of the paper will be taken up with a discussion of
the relation between my position and those of the authors just discussed.
In summary: with Polger & Shapiro I accept that putative instances of MR
can be offered reductive explanations, but pace Polger & Shapiro, I hold that
these still ought to count as MR; with Batterman I accept that there is MR,
but pace Batterman I hold that this is reductively explicable; with Sober I
accept that there is MR and that it can be explained, but pace Sober I argue
that an additional explanatory strategy is required in order satisfactorily to
address the MR explanandum.
2 What is Multiple Realisation?
2.1 Definition
A higher-level phenomenon is multiply realised iff the same
phenomenon is realised in at least two different lower-level sys-
tems.
In §2.2 I articulate what would be required for a reductive explanation
of instances of MR which conform to this definition. First, the definition
2More technical aspects of the discussion which specifically concern the renormalisation
group explanation of universality are found in Franklin (2018, 2019) with a response in
Batterman (2019).
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requires clarification on two counts: what is meant by ‘same phenomenon’?
And what is meant by ‘different systems’?
Phenomena are posited on the basis of experimental data and provide
evidence for more general theories.3 Examples of phenomena include “weak
neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects
in human memory” (Bogen and Woodward (1988, p. 306)). Phenomena are
individuated by the scientific theory which describes them, thus we may
say it’s the same phenomenon if it is well described by the same theory in
the same conditions.
Importantly for compatibility with multiple realisability, phenomena
are not individuated in terms of their realisers. Thus, as discussed below,
an entity may be identified as an electrical conductor because it satisfies as-
pects of circuit theory, but it’s not consequently possible to infer its specific
constitution. A principal feature of systems instantiating MR is that they
may be identified at multiple levels where higher-level identification does
not commit us to any specific realisation.
Multiply realised phenomena are invariant with respect to certain per-
turbations of the underlying system. I distinguish between two ways a
system might be perturbed.4 On the one hand, consider varying the par-
ticular microstate of a particular system – i.e. changes which the system
might actually undergo. On the other, consider varying the very nature and
make-up of the system itself – these are counterlegal or imagined changes.
Phenomena which are invariant with respect to the first kind of pertur-
bation are called ‘robust’ – some phenomenon is robust if it’s invariant with
respect to changes allowed by the laws at the lower level. For example,
most thermodynamic phenomena are robust across a wide range of differ-
ent molecular arrangements, where the molecular laws allow the system
to transition from one to another arrangement.5 The notion of changes al-
lowed by the laws is level-relative: when discussing the robustness or mul-
tiple realisation of a given phenomenon we (implicitly) specify a higher
and lower level of description. Relative to such level-based descriptions
3MR is here defined in terms of (kinds of) phenomena. Although MR may alternatively
be defined in terms of kinds of entities, nothing crucial to the argument relies on this choice:
one may view electrical conductivity as a multiply realised phenomenon, or, alternatively
electrical conductor may be considered to be a kind of entity.
4See Bickle (2016); Hu¨ttemann, Ku¨hn, and Terzidis (2015) for similar distinctions.
5Robustness is particularly relevant to characterising emergence, see Butterfield (2011);
Franklin and Knox (2018).
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a particular precision of description will be appropriate, and the allowed
changes will be consequently defined.
By contrast, a phenomenon is multiply realisable if its description is
invariant with respect to changes at the lower level forbidden by the laws.
This distinction will be further exemplified in the next section where I claim
that electrical conductivity is multiply realised by, say, lithium and potas-
sium, where no realistic process can convert a strip of lithium into a strip
of potassium. On the other hand, strips of either metal will be robust for a
range of different perturbations: the same macroscopic physical properties
will be exhibited even where constituent atoms have moved about.
The aim in making this distinction is to ensure that MR is not too cheap:
every higher-level phenomenon is robust with respect to some perturba-
tions, but MR phenomena are thought to posit special explananda.
Two further comments are relevant. First, higher levels are generically
restricted both temporally and spatially; consequently, changes are nomo-
logically impossible at some level if they happen so rarely that they fall
outside the time-scale of that level. As such, a phenomenon may count
as multiply realised by two different systems even where, on sufficiently
long time-scales, some set of otherwise allowed changes would lead to one
system’s becoming the other. Thus, pressure in a CO2 gas is robust because
there are various different microstates which realise the same pressure, and
transitions between those microstates are allowed by the lower-level laws.
On the other hand, pressure in gases is multiply realised because both CO2
and Ne gases may realise the same pressure, but on timescales less than the
age of the universe a CO2 gas cannot change into an Ne gas.
Second, this distinction will not define a division between robustness
and MR which always squares with our intuitions. For example, certain
colour changes in metals will be dynamically possible while others will not;
thus differently coloured metals are, in some instances, trivial but genuine
examples of MR. Any way of excluding such boring cases would be arbi-
trary, but this is not a problem. As soon as we can explain a given instance
of MR, it may count as less surprising, or even boring; but the requirement
that MR be surprising would, thus, effectively undermine the interesting
philosophical and scientific projects of explaining MR – such a stipulation
would beg the title question of the paper.
The distinction between MR and robustness is useful: it allows that,
while there are genuine instances of MR in the world, not every higher-
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level phenomenon is multiply realised; however, I do not claim that the
distinction is profound. The distinction is nonetheless essential to those
who wish to claim both that MR is instantiated in various contexts, and
that it is by definition incompatible with reduction. If those philosophers
fail to make this distinction they will have a very difficult case to argue;
if all robust phenomena count as multiply realised, and multiply realised
phenomena are irreducible, then every higher-level phenomenon will be
classed as irreducible.
2.2 Explanation and Reduction
A further distinction is worth making at this stage between explanations
which refer to MR phenomena, and reductive explanations which tell us
how MR is possible. One reason to take MR seriously within the philoso-
phy of science is that the former kind of explanation is commonplace: many
different scientific explanations refer to MR phenomena; that fact leaves it
open whether or not reductive explanations of MR are available. My goal is
non-eliminativist – as such I think it inadvisable to attempt to purge science
of reference to MR phenomena. In other words, I do not purport to replace
explanations which refer to MR phenomena with reductive explanations,
rather I aim to explain why such reference is successful.
With that distinction in hand, MR may be offered two kinds of reduc-
tive explanation. First, one may explain the MR phenomenon in terms of
the properties of each individual realiser – call this ‘specificity explanation’;
second, one may explain the MR phenomenon in terms of the common fea-
tures shared by each realiser, and the details which make such common fea-
tures sufficient for the occurrence of the phenomenon – call this ‘common-
ality explanation’. Specificity explanations do not explain multiple realisa-
tion, they rather focus on the individual behaviour in each system; com-
monality explanations, by contrast, do explain multiple realisation. One
may get an intuitive grasp on the need for commonality explanations if one
considers the following story, used by Franklin (2018, p. 228) to illustrate
the distinction between these two explanatory strategies:
a traveler visits a foreign country and goes from house to
house observing the local customs. She observes an oddity in
the locals’ behavior: in each family she visits, the youngest child
sleeps in a bed angled such that his or her head is vertically
6
lower than his or her feet. At each visit, she asks for an ex-
planation of this phenomenon, and every family offers a differ-
ent answer: “because he’s short and this way he’ll grow taller,”
“because greater blood flow to her head will increase her intel-
ligence,” “because it’s cooler and his head otherwise becomes
hot,” “because that’s the only way to avoid the awakening smell
of dinner,” and so on.
The dissatisfaction the traveller will experience is due, I claim, to the
inadequacy of specificity explanations. By contrast, if the traveller were
told of a shared communal belief that the peculiar sleep orientation reduces
cholesterol, and that cholesterol reduction is prized in that country above
all countervailing considerations, this would amount to a commonality ex-
planation and resolve her confusion.
One way to justify this distinction is by thinking of such explanations as
contrastive. A relevant contrast for specificity explanations is a case where
each instance exhibits a different phenomenon – specificity explanations
should tell us why children sleep head down rather than head up. The rel-
evant contrast for commonality explanations is where the behaviour is no
longer shared – commonality explanations tell us why all children sleep
with the same orientation rather than sleeping with different orientations in
each household.
The way to offer a commonality explanation is as follows: one explains
the common behaviour by identifying an aspect or feature which is shared
by the different systems. While merely pointing to the commonality is in-
adequate to a full explanation of MR, a commonality explanation explains
if one additionally demonstrates that the common features lead to the ob-
served common behaviour in each case. While in some cases this second
step may be left out, it is implicitly required. For example, in the analogy
the commonality explanation would be undermined if it turned out that
many of the families did not think that avoiding the build-up of cholesterol
trumps the relative discomfort of their children.
In summary, when MR is instantiated and explicable, its realisers have
both commonalities and heterogeneities; so, an explanation of MR must
both identify the commonalities and demonstrate that the heterogeneities
are irrelevant. That is, I claim that the only adequate explanations of MR
are commonality explanations. As such, henceforth, all references to ex-
planations of MR carry the implicit assumption that the explanation is a
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commonality explanation.
Now we have a general model for how one might explain MR, we ought
to ask: are such explanations reductive explanations? If reduction is pos-
sible, for any given phenomenon, one may understand why it’s multiply
realised from the bottom up. The reductive constraint on explanation of
MR amounts to the stipulation that the identified commonalities are lower-
level commonalities, and the processes which secure the irrelevance of the
heterogeneities are lower-level processes.
Such reductive explanations need not be eliminativist: in fact, many
reductive explanations will establish that the MR phenomenon is to be in-
cluded in our ontology – identifying the commonalities and the processes
which secure the irrelevance of heterogeneities establish that the multiple
realisation is not a pure artefact of our descriptive practices. Reductive
explanations of MR thus underwrite the value of the unified multiply re-
alised description and explanation even while it allows us to understand,
from the bottom up, why the multiple realisation obtains.
Note that, at various stages through the process of seeking to explain
commonalities, we may acknowledge that the commonality is not in fact
out there in the world; that, instead, it’s illusory, or that it’s a consequence
of our epistemic limitations, or an artefact of our organisation of the world.
Where that happens the demands for explanation, and the prospects for
anti-reductionism if explanation fails are correspondingly lessened – this
overlaps with the debate over scientific realism, and, as such, will not be
further discussed here.6
A reductive explanation of MR involves the identification of underlying
common features and the demonstration, in lower-level terms, that such
features are sufficient for the common behaviour. In the next section this
framework for explaining MR is exemplified with a case study. Note that
different processes may be responsible in each realiser for the irrelevance of
the heterogeneities. It’s thus worth emphasising that, while the common-
alities are in common, an account of each individual system is generically
required in order to establish that the commonalities are sufficient for the
MR phenomena to occur.
6It’s worth emphasising that the question here is not whether we should be metaphysi-
cal realists about the universal which putatively underlies a given common feature; rather
we are interested in whether or not there is any stable way of identifying the putative com-
monality such that it doesn’t depend on the way we happen to do science.
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The upshot of this section is that MR is defined such that it is instan-
tiated in the world and that reductive explanation is possible. I do not
claim that all cases of MR can be offered reductive explanations; in my
view, that’s an empirically sensitive question. The advantage of my frame-
work is that that question can be addressed.
3 A Case Study
The reductive strategy outlined above is, in this section, cashed out in terms
of a prototype reductive explanation of multiple realisation.
Consider the fact that various different metals conduct electricity.7 For
our purposes, we may restrict attention to the Alkali (group I) metals; al-
though electrical conductivity is, of course, multiply realised by a far wider
class of materials, the reductive story is much simpler if we stick to this
restricted class, though the philosophical moral generalises. Group I met-
als all have many properties in common, but do have clear differences: for
example they have different melting and boiling points, different densities,
and burn with different colours.8 While each metal has different resistiv-
ity, their electrical conductivity is the multiply realised phenomenon which
serves as my case study. If one prefers to think of MR in terms of kinds, then
this could be substituted for the claim that electrical conductor is multiply re-
alised by these different metals.
It’s worth emphasising that this example is fairly naturalistic: we needn’t
think of electrical conductivity in terms of human interactions – it mani-
fests, for example, when lightning strikes. If one still has reservations that
the example is unacceptably ad hoc or anthropocentric, a similar reductive
approach is applied to the universality of critical phenomena in Franklin
(2019), which, as briefly discussed in §4.2, has been touted by some as a
paradigm instance of irreducible MR.
Moreover, the phenomenon fits my definition: first, the phenomenon
is the same phenomenon insofar as it is described by the same higher-
level scientific theory. Solid state physics, see e.g. Kantorovich (2004), uses
the same formalism to describe the conductivity of all such metals. At a
7This example is in part inspired by that in Aizawa (2013).
8Lithium, sodium, potassium, rubidium and caesium burn with red, yellow, violet, yel-
low violet and blue flames respectively; see Dye and Tepper (2018).
9
greater level of abstraction, circuit theory also uses the same functional re-
lationships to describe this phenomenon independently of which particular
metal realises the conductivity.
Second, the realisers of electrical conductivity are different. Although
fission and fusion may occur in specialised circumstances at an atomic
level, it is nomologically impossible for a piece of lithium to transform
into a piece of sodium within a time-scale of the order of the age of the
universe. Despite their sharing a variety of physical properties, there is
no non-question-begging way of saying that lithium is identical to, say,
sodium.
Can the fact that electrical conductivity is multiply realised be reduc-
tively explained? Following the framework outlined above, such explana-
tion requires the identification of commonalities between realisers and fea-
tures which make the heterogeneities irrelevant to the shared behaviour, all
in lower-level terms.
Two properties of group I metals make them such good conductors: the
fact that they have a single electron in their outer shell, and the arrange-
ment of the repeated unit cells of the metal’s lattice structure.
Figure 1: Figure from Lewis (1995). A representation of the distribution of electrons in a
metal. This is not to scale.
Group I metals all have a free electron in their outer shell. This elec-
tron may, with little energetic cost, dissociate from its atom. As displayed
in figure 1, such electrons form a cloud which is distributed among the
atoms in the lattice. The crucial feature which allows for conductivity is
that the quantum wavefunction which represents the state of each electron
will then be delocalised and spread across the whole material. The exclu-
sion principle precludes such electrons from inhabiting the same state, as
such they are effectively non-interacting in the delocalised cloud, which is
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consequently well described as a freely moving gas.
The regular lattice structure in figure 1 means that there is no net force
acting on the cloud. This has the consequence that, when an electric field is
applied, the electron gas may freely travel in the direction of the field lines
and form an electric current. In brief: dissociated electrons form quantum
mechanical waves in periodic potentials – that’s what allows electrical con-
ductivity to be exhibited in multiple different metals.
The commonality among all the metals is that they have the same num-
ber of electrons in their outer shell and that they have similar lattice struc-
tures. These are, of course, lower-level commonalities. Although conduc-
tivity is identifiable at the higher level, the features which lead to common
electrical conductivity in various systems can be specified in lower-level
terms.
The remaining feature to be explained is that the differences between
the metals – the heterogeneities – are irrelevant to the behaviour of interest.
Only if that can be established may we explain how the common features
are sufficient for the common behaviour. The irrelevance of heterogeneities
may, however, also be explained in lower-level terms. There are two salient
features which distinguish group I metals at the atomic scale; first, each
metal has a different number of electrons – that difference is irrelevant due
to the stability of the filled shells. At low temperatures, electrons in in-
ner shells are not readily excited and their different numbers are irrelevant.
Although these differences will become relevant as the temperature is in-
creased, this does not undermine the explanation – it is a generic feature
of multiple realisation that the common behaviour is only exhibited in re-
stricted contexts.
The second way in which group I metals differ from each other lies in
their different proton and neutron numbers. However, the different consti-
tutions of the nuclei are irrelevant since they all compose lattice structures.
As noted above, this structure ensures a periodic potential which allows
the electron gas to flow freely throughout the metal. The periodic potential
of the lattice can be explained in terms of the underlying atomic bonding
structure which leads to the lattice formation.
It’s important to bear in mind that, while this simplified case study in-
volves a similar account of the irrelevance of heterogeneities for each re-
aliser, in many contexts such stories will diverge – so long as the different
systems have different underlying properties and these are irrelevant, the
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process by which they are irrelevant may differ for each system. Even in
the current case study, the processes which secure irrelevance of hetero-
geneities may differ between materials: I noted that the different nuclear
constitutions are screened off by the fact that the electrons interact with a
periodic potential, but the fact that there’s a periodic potential depends on
the lattice structure, which may differ among different metals. This is a
mild difference, but it illustrates the broader point that part of explaining
MR involves taking account of the peculiarities of each realiser.
In sum, we may adduce, in lower-level terms: first, the commonalities
– alkali metals conduct electricity in the same way because of their sin-
gle outer-shell electron; and second, the irrelevance of the heterogeneities
which follows from the stability of the inner shells and the periodic lattice
structure.
In the following, I compare my account, where MR is fairly common-
place but can be reductively explained, to some recent literature on explain-
ing MR.
4 Views in the Literature
4.1 Polger and Shapiro
Polger and Shapiro in numerous publications (see their (2016) and refer-
ences therein) have done a great deal of work to demonstrate that, for var-
ious putative instances of MR, the realisers in fact share common causal
structure. Insofar as their project can, thus, be construed as providing re-
ductive explanations of MR, our methodologies overlap.
According to Shapiro (2000, p. 646):
two realizations of a kind T are in fact different kinds of re-
alizations of T only when they differ in their causally relevant
properties, that is, the properties by which they contribute to
the capacity, purpose, goal, and the like that serves to individu-
ate T as the kind that it is.
Shapiro goes on to argue that MR is in fact rather rare, because in many
putative instances of MR the two realisations don’t differ with respect to
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causally relevant properties, they rather differ with respect to their causally
irrelevant properties. For example, given the analysis in the previous sec-
tion, his account implies that one ought not to say that the kind electrical
conductor is multiply realised simply in virtue of the fact that both lithium
and potassium conduct electricity. This is because the features which dis-
tinguish lithium from potassium are causally irrelevant to individuation
qua electrical conductor.
This view is defended by Polger and Shapiro (2016) who consider a
range of neurological case studies that have been described as instances of
MR. They suggest that in almost all such cases the causal process which
gives rise to the putatively multiply realised kind is identical.9 For these
philosophers, in order to qualify as MR, the salient causal structure must
be different.
However, in my view, Polger and Shapiro err in claiming that once
common causal structure has been identified, the phenomena in question
should no longer count as multiply realised.
Firstly, I think the project of relabelling putatively multiply realised
phenomena is unlikely to succeed. It’s commonplace in philosophy to con-
sider phenomena such as pain and a square peg failing to fit into a round hole to
be multiply realised, and one is unlikely to make much headway in chang-
ing the way such phenomena are talked about. Moreover, as discussed
in more detail in the next subsection, the term ‘universality’ in physics
seems well described as a subspecies of MR, yet physicists find universality
throughout the physical world. I think it far better to agree that the cases
so described are in fact instances of MR, and then to seek to explain them.
This discussion results in a stand-off: on my view multiple realisation
is fairly commonplace, but can be explained, on Polger and Shapiro’s view,
it’s much rarer, but can’t be explained. In Polger and Shapiro (2016, p. 39),
they defend their view by claiming that a more liberal view “entails an un-
desirable profligacy of distinct realizations for every kind, and undermines
the significance of realization within debates over the autonomy of the spe-
cial sciences”. While I agree that just any lower-level variation is insuffi-
cient for MR, I think that the MR-robustness distinction drawn above in §2
rules out ‘undesirable profligacy’. On the other hand, regarding autonomy,
9While they (ibid., p. 73) accept that genuine multiple realisation is commonly found
among artefactual kinds, they note that the interesting philosophy of science questions pre-
suppose naturalistic multiple realisation.
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I’d argue that the autonomy of the special sciences is, in fact, closely related
to multiple realisation as I define it: as Polger and Shapiro acknowledge
(ibid., chapter 10.4), a system has some claim to autonomy if it provides for
prediction and explanation at the higher level. Insofar as such autonomy
can be explained, the threat to reduction is mitigated, but the debate over
such cases is only confused by claiming that autonomy, or indeed MR, is
rare but mysterious.
Secondly, Polger and Shapiro’s position makes the MR explanandum ex-
tremely difficult to express. We can no longer ask ‘how come this phe-
nomenon is multiply realised?’ – multiple realisation cannot be explained
in principle, this is because the explanatory strategy outlined above would
render a phenomenon singly realised on Polger and Shapiro’s account.
While we might instead ask ‘how come these systems share a common
causal structure?’ that explanandum does not seem to call out for explana-
tion, as, on their view, it is the same kind of system which shares a common
causal structure with itself.
The inability to express this explanandum is a non-trivial loss to the
philosophical enterprise. It’s a discovered fact about the world that there
are many phenomena which are identified independently of their reali-
sation and seem to be instantiated in multiple different kinds of system.
Failing to acknowledge this as an explanandum would be sidestep the sub-
stantial challenge to reduction which MR (or putative MR) poses. Where
we find MR there seems to be something about the world which the re-
ductionist can’t account for; it’s only by accepting MR as something to be
explained, and showing how it can indeed be reductively explained that
that challenge may be met.
Lastly, even if Polger and Shapiro’s approach is taken to provide an ex-
planation of MR, their explanatory strategy is somewhat lacking. That’s
because, while they rightly emphasise the importance of demonstrating
what’s in common between the realisers, they do not require that we also
demonstrate that the heterogeneous features are irrelevant. As discussed
above, this is a significant aspect of the explanandum. MR prompts us to
wonder how these different systems end up behaving the same way. It’s the
very fact that different systems act similarly which is so remarkable – that’s
what motivates Fodor (1974) in his discussion of the multiple realisation
of currency and Putnam (1975) in his discussion of the multiple realisation
of square and round pegs. That there is MR is a consequence of the fact
that genuinely different systems do, in some circumstances, exhibit identi-
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cal phenomena. MR is thus explained by showing both that such systems
have features in common, and that, in those circumstances, their differ-
ences are irrelevant. By missing this latter part of the explanation, Polger
and Shapiro fail adequately to respond to the anti-reductionist’s challenge.
4.2 Batterman and Sober
Multiple realisation in physics has not received the same degree of atten-
tion in the literature as cases from psychology. This is unfortunate because
the physics context significantly undermines the plausibility of claims that
multiple realisation is purely an artefact of our linguistic practices.
Batterman (2000, 2018) is primarily responsible for bringing attention
to such cases, though a significant literature has developed in response to
some of his claims.10 Multiple realisation in physics is generally known
as ‘universality’, and there are many striking examples whereby systems
as diverse as liquids and ferromagnets exhibit quantitatively identical phe-
nomena in particular circumstances. Many hundreds of scientific papers
have been written on this topic and many can be construed as seeking to
explain how it is that the multiple realisation comes about.
Batterman’s view is that there is MR, and that it can be explained, but
he claims that MR can only be explained anti-reductionistically. As such, he
denies the potential for the kind of reductive explanatory strategy outlined
above. This is not the place to rebut Batterman’s technical arguments, for
that, see Franklin (2019). However, an important insight due to Batterman,
on which I build in this paper, is that the MR explanandum requires a sui
generis explanatory strategy. While I have argued that carrying out such
a strategy can provide evidence for reduction, and Batterman disagrees, I
follow him in claiming that once one acknowledges that there is MR in the
world, a novel explanandum follows. It’s particularly worth highlighting
this set of claims due to Batterman because they serve to undermine the
explanatory pluralism advocated by Sober (1999).
My claim in this paper has been that specificity explanations of MR phe-
nomena are inadequate to address the MR explanandum. Once we have a
reductive explanation for why lithium is a good electrical conductor, and
why sodium is a good electrical conductor we still have an explanatory de-
10See e.g. Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018) and references therein; Wilson (1985) is an earlier
example of discussion of MR in physics.
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mand: what common feature of group I metals leads to the phenomenon
that they all conduct electricity? Where the same phenomenon is observed
in all these different systems we have multiple realisation and thus we have
an explanandum for which the reductionist ought to be able to provide a re-
ductive explanation. Insofar as they can’t, the MR challenge to reduction
remains unanswered.
Elliott Sober purports to deflate an argument of this flavour with ex-
planatory pluralism:
Generality is one virtue that an explanation can have, but
a distinct – and competing – virtue is depth, and it is on this
dimension that lower-level explanations often score better than
higher-level explanations. The reductionist claim that lower-
level explanations are always better and the anti-reductionist
claim that they are always worse are both mistaken.
[Sober (1999, p. 560), original emphasis]
Sober argues that multiple realisation need not trouble the reduction-
ist. He does so by observing that different kinds of explanation are use-
ful or applicable to different ends. He observes that adding content to an
explanation does not stop its being an explanation and that reductions –
which offer bottom-up explanations – will generally be of interest even if
the higher-level explanations are adequate in some contexts. Sober’s ar-
guments are well-taken: it’s certainly the case that proportionate higher-
level explanations are often superior qua explanations of higher-level ex-
plananda. However, not just any kind of explanation is adequate to explain
MR per se. Given that Sober is talking about multiple realisation and ex-
planatory approaches thereto, it seems fair to say that he has missed the
anti-reductionist MR advocates’ point. This observation is emphasised by
Batterman (2018), who identifies an explanandum which is missed by many
reductionists:11
MR: How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typ-
ically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the
macro-scale?
11Note that Morrison (2012, pp. 164-165) makes a similar point – she argues that what
I call specificity explanations are inadequate to explaining instances of MR and that some
top-down (anti-reductionist) constraints are necessary.
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. . .
if one thinks (MR) is a legitimate scientific question, one
needs to consider different explanatory strategies. The renor-
malization group and the theory of homogenization are just
such strategies. They are inherently multi-scale. They are not
bottom-up derivational explanations.
[Batterman (2018, pp. 4, 14-15)]
I agree with Batterman that standard reductionist approaches miss the
MR explananda. The question labelled MR prompts us to look at the distinct
realisers of multiply realised phenomena and ask why all of these different
underlying systems realise the same higher-level phenomenon. Batterman
counters Sober’s explanatory pluralism by arguing that, in certain cases,
answers to MR are incompatible with reduction. He claims that universal-
ity is an instance of multiple realisation and that the full explanation of uni-
versality necessarily proceeds at the higher level. Batterman’s contention is
that lower-level and higher-level explanations are not equally adequate for
understanding cases of MR. In fact, specifically for certain such cases the
higher-level explanations are the only ones which are able to address the
principal explanandum.12
While I disagree with Batterman’s anti-reductionist conclusion, I accept
his more general assertion: that it’s not good enough simply to say, as Sober
does, that different explanations are good for different ends. The different
descriptions and explanations of electrical conductivity – some in terms of
abstracted circuit theory, and others in terms of the microscopic details of
each metal – do not lead to an answer to MR. And it is that question which
really provides the motivation for the anti-reductionist. Sober’s pluralism
is inadequate to refute the assertion that multiple realisation is, ipso facto,
inexplicable from the bottom up.
I have argued in this paper that MR may nonetheless be answered re-
ductively. That is, I claim that, if we adduce the commonalities among
lower-level realisers and identify the lower-level processes which make
the heterogeneities irrelevant to the common behaviour, then we have pro-
vided a reductive explanation of MR. As such, the anti-reductionist’s mo-
tivations may be addressed, and the compatibility of MR with reduction
12Although Batterman thinks that universality can be offered an explanation, he contends
that this explanation is unavailable from the bottom up due to its appeal to renormalisation
group (RG) methods; his technical argument is criticised in Franklin (2018, 2019).
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may be established. MR poses an explanandum which requires a sui generis
explanation; it’s just that reductive explanations of MR are available.
5 Conclusion
Multiple realisation arguments have been taken by many to settle the case
against reduction. And yet there’s a fair bit of ambiguity over the structure
of the argument. One strand of the debate observes that, given multiple re-
alisation, the higher-level facts do not determinately pick out unique lower-
level states. However, rather than an argument, this is more a restatement
of multiple realisation, and it is hardly surprising: everyone accepts that
higher levels are more coarse grained and less determinate than lower lev-
els.
A better argument notes that multiple realisation implies that the higher-
level descriptions are autonomous in a well-defined sense: they are invari-
ant with respect to a swapping out of the lower-level constituents. It is then
claimed that this autonomy poses an explanatory challenge to reduction –
how come a common higher-level description is available despite lower-
level heterogeneity? I take this challenge to be one which the reductionist
ought to meet, and it’s the purpose of this paper to show that this challenge
may be answered. Consequently, I’ve set out and defended a framework
for providing reductive explanations of MR.
It’s worth considering once again the response of those philosophers
who’d define MR such that it’s, in principle, incompatible with reduction.
First, they might argue that the kind of reductive explanation discussed
here is insufficient for reduction. As such, they might accept that MR can
be reductively explained in the sense articulated above, but that some other
kind of reduction is ruled out. Importantly, I think that MR is, in general,
a sign that we should think the higher level ineliminable: that, in most
cases, MR phenomena should be included in our ontological inventory. As
such, I have no quarrel with those who take MR to be incompatible with
eliminativist reduction. I have merely argued that this does not imply that
MR is mysterious or is inexplicable from the bottom up.
Second, they might claim that, while the framework developed here
does lead to greater understanding of various worldly phenomena in many
contexts, such phenomena do not count as MR. MR would thus be rather
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rare, but wherever it was in fact instantiated, it would be inexplicable. My
disagreement here is pragmatic: I think it more useful to define the term
such that it poses an explanatory challenge which can, in some though not
necessarily all cases, be answered.
In this paper, I claimed that multiple realisation is found whenever the
same phenomenon is realised by multiple different systems. I went on to
argue that it is best to view the MR argument against reduction as posing
a novel explanandum. MR requires new explanations in addition to those
provided by traditional reductive approaches; the availability of such ex-
planations must be assessed on a case by case basis. Thus, MR does raise a
problem for reduction, and it’s an empirically sensitive matter whether or
not reduction can withstand the MR argument.
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